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ABSTRACT 
Employment Protection and Product Market Competition  
by Sebastian Kessing 
A firm facing employment protection will defend its market position more fiercely than 
a firm operating without such restrictions. However, ex ante it will be more reluctant to 
expand its market position. For the benchmark case of contest competition, the 
defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average 
market position. 
 
Keywords:  Employment protection, contests, all-pay auction  
JEL classification numbers: D44, J63 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Kündigungsschutz und der Wettbewerb auf Produktmärkten 
Ein Unternehmen, das Kündigungsschutzbestimmungen ausgesetzt ist, verteidigt seine 
Marktposition stärker als ein konkurrierendes Unternehmen, das ohne derartige Restrik-
tion agiert. Ex ante wird es jedoch vorsichtiger sein, seine Marktposition auszudehnen, 
da es die potentiellen Kosten im Falle einer späteren Verschlechterung der eigenen 
Marktposition vermeiden möchte. Für den Benchmarkfall, in dem der Wettbewerb 
zwischen den Unternehmen die Form eines Contests annimmt, überwiegt der defensive 
Effekt: Ein Unternehmen, das Kündigungsschutzbestimmungen ausgesetzt ist, hat 
langfristig eine stärkere Position im Markt als ein Wettbewerber der frei von solchen 
Restriktionen agiert. 
1 Introduction
Employment protection (EP) regulations are frequently blamed for hurting
ﬁrms’ competitiveness. They expose ﬁrms to a hold up problem. The workers
a ﬁrm hires when demand for its products is high will be protected later
on when demand is low. This problem has been extensively analysed in
the literature on dynamic labour demand, see Nickell (1986). However, EP
also has important implications for product market competition. If a ﬁrm
already has hired workers, who are protected by EP regulations, it will ﬁercely
defend its market position. In cost terms, the decision to expand increases
future ﬁxed costs and reduces variable costs. Expanding own production
by employing new workers threatens the ﬁrm with potential costs if these
workers become redundant later. Thus, the ﬁrm will be more cautious about
expanding its market position ex ante. This inﬂuences ﬁrms’ behaviour, if
they interact strategically in imperfectly competitive markets. The aim of
this paper is to study the nature of this relationship and to derive the eﬀects
on the product market.
Two aspects are essential for analysing the eﬀects of EP on product mar-
ket competition. First, for the assessment of the average eﬀect of EP on
a ﬁrm’s market position a dynamic setting must be explicitly considered in
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order to trade oﬀ the ex ante and ex post eﬀects. Second, while the mecha-
nism analysed in this paper is present in many settings, its importance will
typically depend on the kind and intensity of product market competition
and the opportunities this oﬀers for ﬁrms to expand and defend their market
position. For simplicity, I focus on the case in which ﬁrms compete with each
other in contests. This case is a natural benchmark, since price and quantity
decisions can be neglected, but ﬁrms can aﬀect demand through their contest
behaviour.
To illustrate what is meant by contest competition, consider the pro-
curement of some large project or a large scale sales contract. In many of
these instances the allocation is not, or is only partly, determined through
the price mechanism. Instead, in such markets potential contractors typi-
cally make substantial eﬀorts to make their oﬀer attractive. Konrad (2000)
lists three main ﬁelds where such eﬀorts may be made. First, speciﬁc R&D
measures may be carried out to tailor the product for a speciﬁc customer.
Second, ﬁrms invest in speciﬁc commitments, that the buyers want, such as
reliable maintenance services. Third, ﬁrms try to inﬂuence decision makers
directly through marketing activities, generous behaviour, or bribes. What
all these activities have in common is that the costs incurred by the ﬁrms
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are essentially sunk. Thus, the competition between the ﬁrms can be well
described by an all-pay auction, a contest.1 As a by-product, this speciﬁca-
tion also allows the results of the analysis to be applied directly to another
important aspect of competition between the ﬁrms, namely competition in
R&D. In such an interpretation the contests can be considered as steps in
a sequential R&D race, where each success implies a major innovation that
guaranties monopoly proﬁts for one period.
I consider a situation in which two ﬁrms repeatedly engage in contests for
contracts. In order to work out the diﬀerential eﬀects of EP, one ﬁrm is based
in country with a ”rigid” labour market and therefore faces EP regulations,
whereas the other ﬁrm operates in a ”ﬂexible” country and is therefore in
a position to hire and ﬁre without restriction. The outcome of the contests
between the ﬁrms is aﬀected by the EP regulations, since they reduce the
rigid country’s ﬁrm’s ﬂexibility by increasing its ﬁxed costs. For such a ﬁrm,
which has already hired workers, losing a contest implies additional costs
to this ﬁrm due to the existing EP provisions. This increases the relative
beneﬁts from winning and consequently aﬀects contest outcome. However,
1For a general discussion of contests and motivation see Dixit (1987) and Skaperdas
and Syropoulos (2002).
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ex ante, if it has not already hired workers, it will foresee the consequences of
winning a contract: workers hired to carry out the contract just won will be
protected later on. Therefore contests in which neither ﬁrm has not already
hired workers will also be aﬀected. The impact of EP on the average contest
outcome is thus assessed by considering a dynamic setting which allows the
interaction between both situations to be captured.
The key result is that employment protection tends to increase the long
run average probability of winning for the ﬁrm from the ”rigid” country and
that it therefore has a stronger average market position. It has a higher
probability of winning if its own workers are protected. If workers have not
yet been hired, the ﬁrms winning probabilities are equal. However, expected
equilibrium proﬁts are equal for both ﬁrms. Finally, welfare will typically
be higher in the rigid country if wage or severance payments include a rent
component which accrues to the workers. The results have to be modiﬁed, if
the ﬁrm from the rigid country is less eﬃcient, the contest success functions
are more noisy, or if employment protection not only reduces ﬁrms’ ﬂexibility,
but also certainly imposes cost increases on the ﬁrm. Such changes weaken
the mechanism responsible for the increase in the average winning probability.
The paper is related to a number of recent contributions that have anal-
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ysed various implications of EP regulations other than the consequences for
labour demand. Glazer and Kanniainen (2002) consider the eﬀects of EP
on a ﬁrm’s choice of risky projects. They ﬁnd that a ﬁrm that faces EP
regulations prefers risk free projects to risky ones, but if confronted with the
choice between two risky projects, it may prefer the riskier one. Two contri-
butions by Saint-Paul (1997, 2002) study the eﬀects of EP on international
specialisation and diﬀerences in innovative behaviour. Countries with a high
level of EP will specialise on mature products and their inventions tend to be
focussed on these industries, whereas countries with low EP produce goods
at the beginning of the product cycle and tend to innovate in these areas.
Fella (2000) has used a search model to analyse how EP can increase workers
productivity by increasing the ﬁrms willingness to invest in general training.
In a similar framework, Belot et al. (2002) show how workers’ eﬀort can
be positively aﬀected by EP provisions. Finally, Koeniger (2002), using a
model of step-by-step innovations, shows that EP will lead to faster growth,
if product market competition is suﬃciently low.
On a more technical level the present study relates to the theoretical dis-
cussion of contests by considering sequentially dependent prizes in repeated
contests. To my knowledge, only Konrad (2001) considers repeated contests.
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However, in his setting, the contest outcome determines whether another
contest is played or not, but it does not aﬀect the players’ valuations over
time. However, in my setting, a contest’s outcome aﬀects next period contest
valuations, giving rise to interesting interaction. Such dynamic interaction
between contest prizes may well be used to study other phenomena.
The paper is organised as follows. Section two presents a two period model
to illustrate the workings of the fundamental mechanism in a ﬁnite horizon
setting. In section three the model is extended to an inﬁnite horizon. Section
four considers the robustness of the results to changes in the assumptions.
Section ﬁve concludes.
2 The two period model
Consider two risk neutral ﬁrms, A and B, that operate from diﬀerent coun-
tries. While in ﬁrm B’s home country the labour market is rather unregu-
lated, ﬁrm A’s home country has labour market rigidities in the from of EP
legislation. The ﬁrms are competing in two periods for contracts in contests.
In the ﬁrst period they compete for the ﬁrst contract, in the second period
for the second contract. In each contest the winning party is determined ac-
6
cording to the following contest success function which relates the two ﬁrms’
eﬀorts eA and eB to their probabilities of winning the contract πA and πB:
πA(eA, eB) =


1
1/2
0


if


eA > eB
eA = eB
eA < eB


, (1)
πB(eA, eB) = 1− πA(eA, eB). The contest success function (1) is called fully
discriminatory, since the party putting in slightly more eﬀort than its coun-
terpart wins the contest for sure. It is particularly relevant since the party
staging the contest maximizes eﬀort by choosing such a scheme. In section
four the robustness of the results to changes in the contest success functions
are discussed.2
Each contract implies a rent of size S for the winning ﬁrm. This rent is net
of the costs incurred by carrying out the contract, including the wages for the
workers hired in that period. At the outset in the ﬁrst period, neither ﬁrm
has hired workers. The ﬁrm winning the contest will hire workers according
to the labour market regulations it faces in its home country to carry out
the contract. Firm B may only hire them for one period, since it operates
2For a general discussion and axiomatization of contest success functions see Skaperdas
(1996).
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in an unregulated labor market. However, since ﬁrm A faces employment
protection regulations, it has to hire them for two periods. Thus, if ﬁrm A
does not win the contest in period two after winning it in period one, it will
still have to pay wages of size γS, γ > 0, to its workers. Alternatively, these
payments may be regarded as severance payments. If it wins the contract,
the workers employed are used to carry out the contract and, after paying
its workers and covering other costs, it again earns a net rent of S. This is a
stylized way to capture typical employment protection legislation. It reduces
the ﬁrm’s ﬂexibility, but, if the ﬁrm manages to win another contract, it does
not increase the ﬁrm’s cost. Section four discusses the resulting changes to
the model if employment protection regulations cause costs to the ﬁrm, which
can not be avoided by winning additional contracts. Finally, note that the
assumption of ﬁxed wage costs for both ﬁrms which also remain unaﬀected by
the existence of employment protection is for simplicity but can be justiﬁed
by assuming a Leontief technology that has to be applied for carrying out
the contract.
In period two, two diﬀerent subgames can arise, depending on which ﬁrm
succeeds in period one. The situation is illustrated in ﬁgure 1. After ﬁrm
A’s success in the ﬁrst period, the contest outcome will be aﬀected by the
8
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Figure 1: If ﬁrm A wins the ﬁrst contest, its workers are subject
to EP in the second period and the contest will be asymmetric.
labor market regulations just introduced. In the subgame following ﬁrm B’s
victory in the ﬁrst round neither ﬁrm has workers with a valid contract, since
ﬁrm B hires on a period by period basis with no additional costs other than
the wages. Therefore, this basically replicates the situation in period one,
in which no ﬁrm has hired workers. However, since the second period is the
last period of the ﬁnite horizon analysis, I assume that in this subgame it is
possible for both ﬁrms to hire workers for one period only. This assumption
will be dropped below in the inﬁnite horizon version.
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As usual the game is solved backwards starting from period two. Consider
ﬁrst the subgame resulting from ﬁrm A’s success in the ﬁrst period. Denot-
ing the variables corresponding to this situation with subscript W, ﬁrm A’s
expected payoﬀ V AW is given as
V AW = π
A
W (e
A
W , e
B
W )S −
(
1− πAW (eAW , eBW )
)
γS − eAW
= πAW (e
A
W , e
B
W ) (1 + γ)S − eAW − γS, (2)
The ﬁrst line of (2) gives the expected payoﬀ as the probability of winning,
πAW , times the prize, S, minus the probability of losing, 1−πAW , times the wage
payments, which are still due, γS, minus contest eﬀorts, eAW . The second line
of (2) rewrites this expected payoﬀ in the form of a contest payoﬀ. This
illustrates that ﬁrm A’s payoﬀ amounts to a sure costs of γS plus a contest
for a prize of size ZAW , Z
A
W = (1 + γ)S. The labour market restrictions have
two eﬀects on ﬁrm A. They imply higher ﬁxed costs, since the wage bill has to
be paid in any case. At the same time, they increase ﬁrm A’s prize, and this
will aﬀect the contest outcome. Firm B’s expected payoﬀ in this subgame is
given as
V BW =
(
1− πAW (eAW , eBW )
)
S − eBW , (3)
with 1 − πAW (eAW , eBW ) = πBW and where the subscript W refers to the fact
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that ﬁrm A has hired workers. For ﬁrm B the expected payoﬀ is just a
standard contest payoﬀ. It equals its valuation of the prize, ZBW = S, times
the probability of winning minus its eﬀorts.
The outcome of contests with a contest success function (1) and two
players with potentially diﬀerent valuations has been extensively analyzed,
see Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) and Baye et al. (1996). While there is
no equilibrium in pure strategies, a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies
exists. Strategies are given as the cumulative density functions FA(eA) and
FB(eB) over the the ﬁrms’ eﬀorts. A key aspect of the solution are the
players’ valuations. The cumulative distribution functions in equilibrium
with 0 < ZB ≤ ZA are
FB
(
eB
)
= 1− Z
B
ZA
+
eB
ZA
for eA ∈ [0, ZB] , (4)
FA(eA) =
eA
ZB
for eB ∈ [0, ZB] , (5)
with F j(ej) = 0 for ej < 0, and F j(ej) = 1 for ej > ZB, j = A,B. The
intuition of the equilibrium is as follows. The supports are explained by the
fact that it is never optimal for ﬁrm B to bid above its valuation. Conse-
quently, it is also not necessary for ﬁrm A to bid that much. Furthermore,
both ﬁrms must be indiﬀerent with respect to a marginal change in eﬀort
over the whole support of their eﬀort distribution. Firm A’s marginal cost
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of increasing its eﬀort by one marginal unit is one. The marginal gain is
given as the marginal increase of winning times the valuation of winning, i.e.
dFA(eA)
deA
ZA. Therefore in equilibrium it must be that 1 = dF
A(eA)
deA
ZA, for all
eA in the equilibrium support of eA, explaining the uniform distribution in
(5). Analogously the argument can be applied to ﬁrm B.
The ﬁrms’ winning probabilities and expected equilibrium eﬀorts can di-
rectly be derived from (4) and (5). For ZB ≤ ZA, they are given as
πA
∗ (
ZA, ZB
)
= 1− Z
B
2ZA
and πB
∗ (
ZA, ZB
)
=
ZB
2ZA
, (6)
EeA
∗
=
ZB
2
and EeB
∗
=
(
ZB
)2
2ZA
. (7)
The equilibrium expected payoﬀs from the contest alone, U j, are given as
UA
∗
= ZA − ZB and UB∗ = 0. (8)
Note that an increase in the valuation of the ﬁrm with the higher valuation
does not aﬀect its own expected eﬀort, but reduces the other ﬁrm’s equilib-
rium eﬀorts. Consequently, the higher valuation ﬁrm’s winning probability
and its expected payoﬀ are increased.
Returning to the second period contest in situation W, this subgame can
now directly be solved. Firm A has a higher valuation of winning since it
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has hired workers:
ZAW = (1 + γ)S > S = Z
B
W .
Substituting into (6) and (7) gives the respective equilibrium probabilities of
winning and expected eﬀorts:
πA
∗
W = 1−
1
2 (1 + γ)
>
1
2 (1 + γ)
= πB
∗
W ,
EeA
∗
W =
S
2
and EeB
∗
W =
S
2 (1 + γ)
.
Substituting into (2) and (3) the expected payoﬀs in equilibrium are calcu-
lated as V B
∗
W = 0 and V
A∗
W = 0. The zero equilibrium payoﬀ of ﬁrm B is not
surprising, since it follows directly from (8). However, for ﬁrm A the increase
in ﬁxed costs γS is exactly compensated by the expected positive payoﬀ from
the contest. Thus, while for contest behaviour and winning probabilities the
diﬀerence between winning and loosing is decisive, for the expected payoﬀ we
must take into account the payoﬀ from winning the contest, the losses from
still having to pay the workers if losing and the eﬀort spent in the contest.
While ﬁrm A’s higher probability of winning leads to an expected positive
gain from the contest, it has to bear the cost of always having to pay its
workers even when there is no work to do. Interestingly, these two eﬀects
exactly balance, so that ﬁrm A’s valuation to be in the subgame with workers
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hired is the same as ﬁrm B’s.
Consider now the subgame following ﬁrm B’s ﬁrst period success and
denote all variables corresponding to this situation with subscript N (No
workers hired). In that case, both ﬁrms’ valuation from winning the contest
is identically S. From (6) and (8) it is evident, that both ﬁrms have an equal
probability of winning, i.e. πA
∗
N = π
B∗
N = 1/2, and the value of the subgame
is identically zero for both ﬁrms, i.e. V A
∗
N = V
B∗
N = 0.
Now solving the game in the ﬁrst period is straightforward. Since for
both subgames the continuation values are zero for both players, their contest
eﬀorts in the ﬁrst period is determined by the size of the rent only. Denoting
all ﬁrst period variables with subscript 1, this is ZA1 = Z
B
1 = S. Again, from
(6) and (8) it follows directly that πA
∗
1 = π
B∗
1 =
1
2
and V A
∗
1 = V
B∗
1 = 0.
In situations in which neither ﬁrm has hired workers the winning prob-
abilities are equal. If ﬁrm A has workers hired, its winning probability is
more than one half and increasing in the size of the costs paid to its workers.
Thus, on average, the ﬁrm operating from a country with a rigid labour mar-
ket wins the contests more often. The expected pay-oﬀs of both ﬁrms are
zero. For ﬁrm B this follows directly from the fact that its contest valuations
are either smaller or equal to ﬁrm A’s. For ﬁrm A the rigidity of its labor
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market represents a strategic advantage in the contest of situation W. Its
higher valuation causes ﬁrm B to reduce its eﬀorts, which in turn implies
a higher probability of winning with the same eﬀort expended as without
employment protection. This creates an expected rent for ﬁrm A from the
contest. However, employment protection implies higher ﬁxed costs to ﬁrm
A, which have to be paid regardless of the contest outcome. The two eﬀects
exactly balance, so that A’s expected payoﬀ in equilibrium is zero, just like
ﬁrm B’s.
3 The inﬁnite horizon model
The fact that, in the subgame following ﬁrm B’s success in the ﬁrst period, it
suddenly becomes possible for ﬁrm A to hire for one period may be justiﬁed
as a ﬁnite time horizon simpliﬁcation. However, one would like to be sure,
that the results do not depend qualitatively on this assumption. Therefore,
the model is now extended to an inﬁnite horizon setting. Again there are
two ﬁrms A and B operating from diﬀerent countries, with only ﬁrm A facing
labour market regulations. As before, ﬁrm A can only sign two period con-
tracts, whereas ﬁrm B always hires for one period. There are inﬁnitely many
15
periods and in each period the ﬁrms are contesting for a contract. In any
period the world may be in one of two possible states - one in which neither
ﬁrm has hired workers, which will be indicated by the subscript N, and one
in which ﬁrm A has hired workers with a binding contract. This latter state
will be indicated by a subscript W.
Starting in a period N, if ﬁrm A loses the contest, the state will remain N,
since ﬁrm B will carry out the contract and ﬁrm A has no reason to hire. If,
however, ﬁrm A wins the contest in situation N, it signs two period contracts
and carries out the ﬁrst contract. Thus, in the next round, it will have hired
workers, such that the state is now W. Then, if ﬁrm A wins the contest in
situation W, it carries out the contract with its already hired labour force.
If it loses, it still has to pay its workers wages of size γS, although workers
will be idle. At the end of period W the contracts always expire, so that
from state W the situations always returns to state N, regardless of which
ﬁrm has won in the contest in situation W.
The inﬁnite horizon model is solved for the Markov perfect equilibrium
(MPE). With an inﬁnite horizon allowing for trigger strategies in the present
setting would lead to a collusive outcome between the two ﬁrms, since there
are substantial rents for both parties to be gained. The exclusion of trigger
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strategies can, however, be defended on various grounds. First, collusion may
not be possible for exogenous reasons, such as competition policy and/or
procurement regulations. Furthermore, the model may be extended to a
setting in which there are various ﬁrms, such that collusive behavior becomes
much more diﬃcult to sustain. Finally, it should be stressed that considering
the inﬁnite horizon is mainly a device to assess the average eﬀects of labor
market regulations without biases caused by last period eﬀects. Similarly, it
can be argued that considering the collusive outcome will only distract from
the main interest of the analysis.
The problem is stationary, with the two diﬀerent situations N and W to
be distinguished. Thus, a strategy of a ﬁrm is a rule specifying the actions
to be taken conditional on being either in situation N or W. Therefore, the
MPE can be found by considering the Nash equilibria in these two situations.
This can be done by making use of the equilibrium properties as speciﬁed in
(4),(5),(6) and (7).
Denote the expected proﬁts V ji , j = A,B and i = N,W , and let δ,
0 < δ ≤ 1, be the discount rate. Consider ﬁrst situation W. If ﬁrm A wins it
gets the rent from the contract plus the discounted continuation value from
being in situation N. If it looses the contest it has to pay γS and gets the
17
discounted continuation value of being in situation N as well. Therefore the
expected proﬁts are
V AW = π
A
W
[
S + δV AN
]
+ (1− πAW )
[
δV AN − γS
]− eAW
= πAW (1 + γ)S − eAW − γS + δV AN . (9)
For ﬁrm B in situation W the expected present value payoﬀ is
V BW =
(
1− πAW
) [
S + δV BN
]
+ πAW δV
B
N − eBW
=
(
1− πAW
)
S − eBW + δV BN . (10)
It is evident from (9) and (10) that situation W is completely analogous to the
second period situation W in the two period model except for the additional
continuation values δV AN and δV
B
N for both players. These do not aﬀect the
players’ valuations of winning the present period contest, ZAW = (1 + γ)S
and ZBW = S. Thus, the equilibrium strategies in situation W are exactly
the same as above and consequently the respective winning probabilities are
given as πA
∗
W = 1 − 1/(2 (1 + γ)) and πB∗W = 1/(2 (1 + γ)). Furthermore, it
also follows from the above analysis that the expected payoﬀs in situation
W from the actual period are zero for both ﬁrms. As before, for ﬁrm B with
the lower valuation, expected eﬀorts just equal expected revenue. Firm A
with the higher valuation has a positive expected payoﬀ from the contest,
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but faces safe wage obligations of the same size. Thus, for both players the
expected value of being in situation W reduces to the expected discounted
value of being in situation N:
V AW = δV
A
N and V
B
W = δV
B
N . (11)
The contests in situation N are somewhat more involved, since contrary to
situation W, the ﬁrms’ prizes also depend on the continuation values in equi-
librium. The expected payoﬀs for ﬁrms A and B in situation N are given
by
V AN = π
A
N
[
S + δV AW
]
+ (1− πAN)δV AN − eAN
= πAN
[
S + δ
(
V AW − V AN
)]− eAN + δV AN , (12)
V BN =
(
1− πAN
) [
S + δV BN
]
+ πANδV
B
W − eBN
=
(
1− πAN
) [
S + δ
(
V BN − V BW
)]− eBN + δV BW . (13)
Making use of (11) the prizes are given as
ZAN = S − δ (1− δ)V AN and ZBN = S + δ (1− δ)V BN (14)
The equilibrium strategies in situation N can be found by considering the
optimal strategies with arbitrary V AN and arbitrary V
B
N . First note, however,
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that V AN or V
B
N can only be positive if the ﬁrms have an expected current
positive payoﬀ from being in state N, since it was already shown that ﬁrms
have an expected payoﬀ of zero from all future W situations. Furthermore,
following (8), this can be true for at most one ﬁrm, the one which has the
higher valuation of winning.
The expected payoﬀs and winning probabilities are summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 In the unique MPE V A
∗
N = V
A∗
W = V
B∗
N = V
B∗
W = 0 and
πA
∗
N = π
B∗
N = 1/2, π
A∗
W = 1− 1/2 (1 + γ) and πB∗W = 1/2 (1 + γ).
Proof of proposition 1: The equilibrium values of πAW and π
B
W were
already derived above. Focussing on situation N, let me ﬁrst show that the
given outcome is actually an equilibrium in situation N. Given that V A
∗
N =
V B
∗
N = 0 it follows from (14) that Z
A
N = Z
B
N = S. The equilibrium strategies
follow directly from (4) and (5), and the winning probabilities are given by
(6) as πA
∗
N = π
B∗
N = 1/2. Furthermore, neither ﬁrm has a positive expected
payoﬀ in state N, such that V A
∗
N = V
B∗
N = 0, and, from (11), V
A∗
W = V
B∗
W = 0.
Let me now show that this is in fact the only equilibrium. First, assume
for contradiction V AN > 0. This can only be, if and only if Z
A
N > Z
B
N and
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V BN = 0. Thus, from (14) Z
A
N = S − δ (1− δ)V AN and ZBN = S. Thus,
ZAN < Z
B
N and consequently V
A
N = 0, which contradicts the assumption.
Consider now the other possibility and assume for contradiction V BN > 0.
This can only be, if and only if ZAN < Z
B
N and V
A
N = 0. From (14) it follows
that ZAN = S and Z
B
N = S + δ (1− δ)V BN . Since ZBN > ZAN ﬁrm B’s expected
contest eﬀort amounts to EeBN = S/2 due to (7). Furthermore, for Z
B
N > Z
A
N
it must be that the equilibrium payoﬀ is given as
V BN =
(
1− S
2 (S + δ (1− δ)V BN )
)[
S + δ (1− δ)V BN
]− S/2 + δ2V BN
= δV BN
Obviously, this can only be true if V BN = 0, contradicting V
B
N > 0.
Thus, the results of the two period model are valid in the inﬁnite horizon
setting as well. In situation N both ﬁrms have an equal probability of win-
ning, whereas in situation W ﬁrm A’s probability of winning is bigger than
B’s. Consequently, in the long run average, ﬁrm A will win more often: the
rigid country’s ﬁrm has a stronger average market position.3 At the same
3The model amounts to a Markov chain with transition probabilities from state W to
N equal to one and the transition probability from state N to W equal to one half, A’s
winning probability in state N. The ergodic probabilities pW and pN of the two states
can be calculated as pN = 11+(1/2) = 2/3 and pW =
(1/2)
1+(1/2) = 1/3. Consequently, ﬁrm
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time, both ﬁrms expected pay-oﬀs are zero.
Finally, consider how welfare is aﬀected in the two countries. First note
that welfare eﬀects will typically depend on the nature of contest eﬀorts.
These may be either wasteful or actually valuable to the customers. This
crucially aﬀects the welfare implications of the eﬀort reduction by ﬁrm B in
situation W. Leaving aside this question by assuming that the contractors
reside in other countries, for example, since both ﬁrms’ payoﬀs are zero,
welfare can only be otherwise aﬀected through the wage payments if these
contain a rent element accruing to the workers. In this case the following
proposition holds:
Proposition 2 If welfare eﬀects of eﬀort changes on both countries can be
neglected and wages contain equal rent elements in the two countries, expected
welfare will be unambiguously higher in the rigid country.
Proof of proposition 2: From the higher average winning probability of
the rigid country it follows that its expected wage bill is higher. Consequently,
the expected rent accruing to the rigid country’s workers is higher and thus
their welfare.
A’s long run average winning probability equals pW πAW + pNπ
A
N =
2
3
(
1− 12(1+γ)
)
+ 13
1
2 =
5
6 − 26(1+γ) > 1/2.
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Typically, however, the average rent element will be higher in the rigid
country, since its workers experience periods - those in which its ﬁrm has
lost the contest with workers still hired - in which its workers are idle but
nevertheless receive wages. This additionally reinforces the positive welfare
eﬀect on the rigid country.
4 Extensions
So far I have assumed that the ﬁrms were equally eﬃcient, so that, for both
ﬁrms winning the contract implied a rent of equal size, i.e. SA = SB = S.
If the ﬁrms diﬀer in their relative costs, the results of the model must be
modiﬁed as follows. If the ﬁrm from the rigid country is more eﬃcient,
SA > SB, the results of the model are unaﬀected. In this case, ﬁrm A’s
higher valuation of winning in situation W still translates directly into higher
expected payoﬀ from the contest with workers already hired. If instead the
ﬁrm from the rigid country is less eﬃcient, SB > SA, the outcome is quite
diﬀerent. In this case the increase in ﬁrm A’s valuation in situation W no
longer converts itself directly into an expected higher payoﬀ of equal size.
As is evident from (8), as long as ZA remains smaller than ZB, the payoﬀ
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from the contest is zero. However, the wage payments are certain, so that
the expected payoﬀ from being in situation W is negative for ﬁrm A. Thus,
while ﬁrm A’s probability of winning is still increased compared to the no EP
benchmark in situation W, the negative expected payoﬀ directly aﬀects the
previous contest in situation N, leading to a higher probability of winning
for ﬁrm B in situation N.
A second variation to be considered is a change in the contest success
function. If the contest success function is not fully discriminatory, the mech-
anism of a higher valuation causing a higher probability of winning in state
W remains valid. However, expected payoﬀs are typically aﬀected, causing
changes in the outcome of the contest in situation N. Consider the benchmark
case of a Tullock contest success function, see Tullock (1980). The proba-
bility of winning is given as πAi (e
A
i , e
B
i ) = e
A
i /
(
eAi + e
B
i
)
and πBi (e
A
i , e
B
i ) =
1 − πAi (eAi , eBi ). Contrary to the fully discriminating contest this contest
success functions produces more ”noise” in the determination of the contest
winner. Furthermore, the contests will allow for equilibria in pure strategies
and both ﬁrms typically earn a positive expected payoﬀ. In this case the
inﬁnite horizon model is no longer tractable, but qualitative insights can be
gained from the two period set-up. Again in situation W in the second pe-
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riod, ﬁrm A’s probability of winning is bigger than one half, due to the higher
prize of ﬁrm A. However, the expected increase in the winning probability
and the sure cost of the wage payments do not oﬀset one another as in the
fully discriminatory case. Instead, ﬁrm A’s payoﬀ is always reduced. This
reduces ﬁrm A’s valuation of winning in the ﬁrst period. Consequently, in
the ﬁrst period ﬁrm B’s probability of winning exceeds ﬁrm A’s.4 To assess
the average eﬀect on the long run average probability of winning, these two
must weighed against one another. While ﬁrm A’s probability of winning in
situation W is bigger than ﬁrm B’s in the ﬁrst period as long as γ is not to
large, no clear statement can be made about the long-run average probabil-
ity.5 Thus, if the contest success function exhibits more noise, the eﬀect of
EP on the average winning probability is less clear cut. Moreover, expected
payoﬀs for the ﬁrm from the rigid country will be lower.
4If contests are of the Tullock type, ﬁrm A’s equilibrium probability of winning in the
second period in situation W is given as πA
∗
W = (1 + γ) / (2 + γ) > 1/2. If δ = 1, ﬁrm B’s
probability of winning in period one equals πB
∗
1 =
16+20γ+5γ2
32+28γ+4γ2 . Therefore π
A∗
W > π
B∗
1 , if
γ < 1 +
√
5
5In the two period case, just adding up the probabilities of being in the various contest
situations times the respective winning probabilities is not valid, since, by construction, the
situation is biased towards situation N and thereby towards a higher average probability
for ﬁrm B.
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Finally, instead of two period contracts, EP can be modelled so that ﬁring
costs arise automatically if the ﬁrm in the rigid country has to ﬁre workers
in any period. The resulting defensive eﬀects are in principal the same as
above. The incentive to delay the paying of ﬁring costs will also increase the
ﬁrm’s winning probability in these states. However, if these costs are such
that they can never be completely avoided, they imply a negative burden
which will reduce ﬁrm A’s probability of winning when no workers are hired
and consequently also reduce the average winning probability. Thus, if the
form of EP not only represents a restriction on the ﬁrm’s ﬂexibility but also
deﬁnitely increases its costs, the average winning probability of the ﬁrm from
the rigid country will be reduced.
5 Conclusion
EP has important implications for product market competition if ﬁrms in-
teract strategically in imperfectly competitive markets. Firms subject to EP
regulations will ﬁercely defend already gained market positions. Ex ante,
however, they are more reluctant to expand their position, since this neces-
sitates taking on workers who will be protected later on. The paper studied
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the benchmark case, in which two ﬁrms compete with each other in contests
for contracts. The diﬀerential eﬀects of EP were analysed in a situation in
which one ﬁrm operates from a ”rigid” country and therefore faces EP regu-
lations, whereas the other operates from a ”ﬂexible” country without labour
market restrictions.
Both for a ﬁnite and an inﬁnite horizon setting, it was shown, that the
rigid country’s ﬁrm wins the contests more often and that it therefore has a
stronger long run market position. With protected workers, the rigid ﬁrm is
a tougher competitor, since its stakes are higher. This defensive behaviour
creates an expected rent which just oﬀsets the ﬁxed wage bill. Since payoﬀs
remain unchanged at zero for both ﬁrms, the contests in the ex ante situation
without hired workers are not aﬀected. Therefore, in these contests the ﬁrms
have equal probabilities of winning. The defensive eﬀect thus dominates
and this creates the stronger average market position. If welfare eﬀects on
contractors are neglected and wages contain a rent element, welfare is higher
in the rigid country.
The ﬁndings cast doubt on the common notion that blames employment
protection and labour market rigidity for hurting ﬁrms’ competitiveness. In
situations with strategic interaction such rigidities may actually help ﬁrms
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to sustain a strong market position.
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